**2AC AT: NATO Evil**

**NATO can be used for progressive ends---it empirically prevents conflict**

**Schablein 18** (Jared Schablein, chair of the Lower Shore Progressive Caucus, a local chapter of Progressive Maryland, 7-25-2018, “Supporting NATO is progressive”, Progressive Maryland, accessed 7-17-2022, <https://www.progressivemaryland.org/supporting_nato_is_progressive> )//kpt

Currently, President Trump like the administrations of old has continued many of these same reckless policies and pointless aggressive wars.  However, President Trump has taken these reckless policies a dangerous step further by undermining and trying to destroy agreements and policies that keep peace and stability in at-risk parts of the world by constantly attacking our closest allies with false claims and outrageous rants. One of the few current US foreign policies that is agreeable and good for both the country and world at large is the United States’ involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, better known as NATO.

NATO was created on April 4, 1949, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Despite popular belief, NATO was created for more than just countering the political and military threat at the time in the Soviet Union.  The treaty set up several commitments and goals for each member nation to uphold and pursue including maintaining peace in Europe, creating cooperation among NATO members, and mutual defense.  The **treaty** also **commits** **members** **to** ideals of **democracy**, **liberty**, **and peaceful resolutions** to international disputes. NATO has been able to withstand the test of time because it has constantly changed and **evolved to meet current** political and international security **concerns** all while maintaining its core goals and beliefs.

Over the years NATO has had many achievements.  These achievements include having seven straight decades of peace within NATO borders; forging over forty partnerships with non-member nations around the world to ensure stability, peace, and **conflict reduction**; enacting international crisis management operations like **peacekeeping** operations **in Kosovo** during the late 1990s -- resulting in the current peace and start of new prosperity in the Balkans; and **working with the African Union to stop piracy off** the **coast of Africa** -- resulting in **piracy** being **down 75%** since 2011.

Despite all NATO’s success, there are still many **challenges** that face the world and the alliance that **one nation cannot handle alone**.  These threats include global **terrorism**, **cyber** attacks, environmental issues like **climate change**, and **Russia’s aggression** in Eastern Europe with the illegal annexation of Crimea and the build-up of military forces along NATO’s borders.  NATO is preparing itself to address these issues by reinforcing its deterrent efforts, supporting international efforts to maintain stability, investing in counter-terrorism, combating climate change and preparing cyber defenses. Together through mutual defense, counter-terrorism, and stability efforts, the United States through involvement in NATO can work with international partners to avoid conflict and build a better world.

Despite Trump, most of the grown-ups in his defense and foreign policy setup want to stay involved in NATO. Why? And why should progressives care?

The first major reason to stay involved in NATO is mutual defense and security between allied nations. The biggest component of NATO’s founding treaty is Article Five, which establishes that an attack on one member ally is considered to be an attack on all allies.  This important article is crucial for many reasons, but principally providing more resources to allies in a crisis.  NATO has many different types of countries both big and small from regions across Europe and North America.  Some smaller nations like the Balkans nation of Montenegro are centered **in regions where there have been decades of** political **instability** and armed conflict.  If an armed conflict arose, **smaller nations** like Montenegro would **have** the resources and **support** needed from outside allies **to repel** outside **attack and** to help **protect** the **country’s people and sovereignty**.

Another positive aspect of Mutual Defense is the fact that it builds close relationships that spill into other aspects of life.  It should be no shock that many of our same NATO allies are also our closest trading partners.  Through trade and international commerce, with other NATO nations, the United States can sell more goods and collectively grow its economy as well our allies, creating mutual economic benefit.  Finally, alliances like **NATO make it easier to share ideas** and culture between nations.  The sharing of ideas and knowledge collectively **improves** and advances of **societies** across the alliance from the United States to Estonia and everywhere in between. Mutual defense also serves as a powerful **deterrent to prevent armed** conflict or acts of aggression toward allied nations.

NATO’s 2014 update, the Readiness Action Plan, sharpens the alliance’s ability to move quickly in fast-moving emergencies, including increasing rapid-response forces and more mobile, small headquarters.

Terrorism is a persistent global challenge that is one of the biggest threats to citizens of the United States and all NATO countries.  Terrorism knows no border, nationality or religion, making it a difficult issue to address and one that no one nation can handle alone. The US works within the Terrorism Intelligence Cell at NATO headquarters and in a hub in Naples, Italy to improve threat awareness and preparedness to respond to attacks – anywhere in the Alliance, including the US and Canada.

 The third and final major reason the **United States should remain involved in NATO** is to maintain stability and prevent conflict around the world. NATO establishes peace by working with international partners from shaping policy to building defense capacity. Over the past several years, NATO has started over 450 collaborative activities among its 29 member nations and 41 partner countries ranging from cyber defense to humanitarian efforts.  NATO  efforts were vital in bringing peace to the Balkans in the 1990’s, preventing World War III during the Cold War, and helping governments rebuild stability after failed wars in the Middle East.  Through building international partnerships and collaborating with member nations, the United States can reduce the number of conflicts that take place around the world and help bring stability to at-risk regions of the world without involving major US presence or armed conflict.

 It is the goal of all progressives to create a US foreign policy that is less militaristic, expensive and aggressive.  That is why as a nation and as a political movement we must remain committed to NATO involvement.  One of the most important things when it comes to bringing peace and stability is this: **If we don’t want US troops** fighting **in foreign lands**, we **need to maintain** our **alliances**. Our commitment must focus on changing foreign policy to reduce the amount we spend on defense and end the number of aggressive wars we enter.  As a member of NATO, our allies can help us achieve that goal by helping in our national security through collaboration and help maintain stability by working with international partners to bring and maintain peace.

That being said, I hope that we can **transform US foreign policy from** its current **militaristic** and aggressive attitude **to working with** our **allies** to ensure peace through other means and working to prevent attacks in our own borders instead of interfering and causing instability in other nations. This **progressive goal can be achieved** if we stay a part of the NATO alliance.

**NATO’s key to progressive action---their framework overemphasizes the US, which leaves us vulnerable to China and Russia’s totalitarianism**

**Riggio 20** (Adam Riggio, writer for the Canada Files, 5-7-2020, “Adam Riggio: Why we must fight for a socialist NATO”, The Canada Files, Accessed 7-21-2022, <https://www.thecanadafiles.com/articles/so> )//kpt

The Radical Progressive Critique of NATO

Here is the radical socialist critique of NATO: its purpose is to install and defend American business interests by maintaining capitalism in Europe, NATO organized secret military associations in its own member countries to prevent European socialism’s democratic political advancement, and is building a global network of alliances to defeat geopolitical enemies.

Marxist historians such as Vijay Prashad have argued that [NATO’s main purpose as a military alliance](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/) was to secure lucrative investments by American businesses and government in the rebuilding of Western Europe’s infrastructure. Other researchers have uncovered more chilling NATO activities throughout Europe during the Cold War. Daniele Ganser’s research on [Operation Gladio](http://hnn.us/articles/12253.html) argues that NATO organized guerrilla groups and spies to provoke increased violence among radical left groups.

These secret NATO-supported groups facilitated crimes, murders, and even the total overthrow of socialist-minded governments throughout alliance members. Ganser has credibly accused one of NATO’s secret armed groups of [kidnapping and murdering](https://www.varsity.co.uk/features/13006) Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, to prevent him from inviting the country’s Communist Party into his parliamentary coalition.

Most progressives know how, in the twenty-first century, NATO has prosecuted the grinding horror show of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and given ample material aid to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. However, modern **NATO** **operates** **on a** much **larger field than** as mere assistance troops to **America’s** **fever dream military imperialism**. The Atlantic alliance has gone global, attempting to encircle the geopolitical powers of Russia and China.

The 29 current member states of NATO include many former Warsaw Pact states, an expansion this century that provoked Russia’s military destabilization of former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Georgia. But NATO also includes an outer ring of states that are affiliates in broader military alliances: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE are all part of a joint protection agreement; NATO holds bilateral military alliances with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Colombia; Afghanistan and Iraq signed similar military alliances with NATO, when both countries were heavily occupied by American troops.

We Are the Casualties of Their Games and Greed

Admitting NATO’S crimes and anti-democratic effects is, however, only the first step to understand the actual bind in which we progressives are stuck. Too many among **progressives** and radical socialists are trapped in this stunted way of thinking because of how we **understand** **neoliberal capitalism as** a **uniquely American** project.

Movements for social progress around the world grow precarious in the shadow of the geopolitical games of our great state powers jockeying for military and economic influence and domination. The socialist left has long been well aware of the brutality and rapaciousness of capitalism.

Decades of research and journalism have demonstrated the central role of American military and economic policy in pressing capitalist development around the world. The intellectual tradition of studying how capitalism began with Karl Marx himself and continues through generations across a variety of disciplines. Many well-educated progressives have studied these traditions, whether in the formal settings of universities to our own learning. But much of this tradition focuses on the American role in promoting global capitalism.

We progressives today must face a terrifying truth: the **American state is not alone in** **enforcing** the **brutal** innovations in **capitalism** that have developed over the last generation.

Monstrosities of Mafia Fascism and Absolutism

Russia was once an ally of socialist liberation movements around the world, though their own revolution under Josef Stalin had collapsed into state-controlled capitalism and government by secret police.

Now, Vladimir **Putin** has restored totalitarian principles of government to Russia, as their domestic policy is the economic and political [devastation of the Russian people](https://www.dw.com/en/masha-gessen-depicts-russias-slide-to-totalitarianism-under-putin/a-47992798). In other words, Putin **facilitated** the **wholesale theft of** hundreds of **billions** of dollars in wealth from the Russian state and its industries to a clique of former bureaucratic and secret police apparatchiks, of which is he leader. Those oligarchs are also leaders and financiers in Russia’s international mafia. Putin has explicitly built his new Russian totalitarianism with significant influence from the [fascist political philosophy of Ivan Ilyin](https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/16/ivan-ilyin-putins-philosopher-of-russian-fascism/).

Russia is emerging again as a major power in our century’s geopolitics, but the collapse and corruption of much of the American government under Trump, as well as their homicidal approach to COVID, has made China the most powerful military and economic state in the world.

For decades, the **Chinese** **state** has **governed** its people **with brutal police enforcement of regime loyalty**, even deploying concentration camps and ethnic cleansing to its conquered territories of [East Turkestan](https://theconversation.com/the-ominous-metaphors-of-chinas-uighur-concentration-camps-129665) and Tibet. More recently, Xi Jinping’s regime has been especially devoted to institutionalizing his absolute rule over China, and the country’s highest political leaders are themselves embedded in corrupt relationships with their [most powerful billionaire businessmen](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/asia/wang-jianlin-abillionaire-at-the-intersection-of-business-and-power-in-china.html).

One need only count the **many** [**murdered journalists in Russia**](https://cpj.org/data/killed/europe/russia/) who have investigated the details of Putin’s gangster regime to know that this geopolitical enemy of America is no friend of the progressive. The same goes for dissidents and whistleblowers who have defied Xi’s official truth: they rot in prison like [Liu Xiaobo](https://www.hrw.org/tag/liu-xiaobo) or disappear from humanity like [Li Wenliang](https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-04-03/coronavirus-china-doctor-tomb-sweeping).

Three Militaries Against Democracy, Not Just One

Despite the destruction that the NATO military alliance has caused in Europe and Asia, we **progressives** face an uncomfortable truth: we **need** **a military powerful enough to stand against** the many threats that **Russia and China** pose to democracy around the world. As well, we must never let our opposition to the threat that America poses to global democracy make us patsies for Russian or Chinese control.

The most potent threat to our own democracies is the destabilization of our democratic societies. A foundation of modern **Russia’s foreign policy** is to **aflame** **social conflicts inside** of **democratic** **polities**, and use weapons of cyber-warfare, **such as viruses and disinformation**.

China has taken a more traditional route to global dominance. **Chinese investments** **in** massive **resource extraction projects across Africa follow** the **model of** the **old** [**British East India Company**](https://africasacountry.com/2020/04/locating-african-agency-in-africa-china-relations). Take almost all profit from mines and oil wells, while trapping their African partner states in unsustainable debt from project financing.

How do we progressive and other ordinary people escape this triple squeeze between three militarized, aggressive superpower states run by mafiosi and billionaire power brokers? Anti-capitalist, socialist, and democratic organization and agitation across the world is really our only answer.

We need NATO, but only because socialist and democratic movements are closer to taking some measure of control away from the corrupt in Europe and the Americas, pessimistic though even these prospects often feel. A socialist Europe and North America would stand against Russia and China as the weapons of war move to the internet and public political movements themselves.

If the NATO states of Europe and North America could unite in an aggressive cyberwar to encourage popular resistance to the brutal mafia totalitarianism of Russia and China, then we will have a chance for global democracy, socialism, a green economy, and a sustainable civilization on Earth.

Until those revolutions happen, we remain in our triple bind. But **collapsing** our **military entirely**, **while geopolitical enemies expand and consolidate theirs**, **is** **a recipe for** our **enslavement**. We remain slaves under neoliberal capitalism, our opportunities ground to dust.

But states with the power of Europe’s and North America’s, run on genuinely egalitarian socialist principles and policies, allied to fight for actual freedom and dignity of all people, will be a greater threat to the menace of totalitarianism than the cash-sick militarism of the old United States ever could have been.

**2AC – Security – FW**

**Our framework is necessary to open up new pathways to solve complex security threats through citizen engagement**

**Bisogno 17** (Raymond Bisogno, June 2017, “Problem Solving in Homeland Security and Creating Policy Conditions For Enhanced Civic Engagement: An Examination of Crowdsourcing Models,” The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/14064>) nihara

This thesis begins with the premise that the world has become a more **dangerous** and **complicated** place due to the spread of **terrorism**, increasingly damaging **weather events**, and other threats to **national** and **economic security**. These threats (in their broadest sense) have become **more diffuse**, and the challenges the government faces to **combat them** more **complicated**. It may not be, at the end of the day, reasonable to expect government to address the entire threat landscape with existing resources alone and leave the public at large essentially unaffected, or perhaps more importantly, uninvolved. The conditions for tapping into citizens’ **intellectual capacity** for **problem-solving**, however, may not be **present**. This thesis explored the potential of crowdsourcing for this purpose, examining cases in various disciplines to discover what worked well and what did not. A principal focus of the research was crowdsourcing experiments and engagement models, as well as a strategy for leveraging technology in these pursuits.

This research did not attempt to identify problem areas (what is broken), dysfunctional programs, or reasons for low engagement. It analyzed the potential benefits of employing **crowdsourcing** models in **homeland security** and its related disciplines, using **appreciative inquiry** to evaluate how existing successful models may open **new pathways** between government and citizens. These pathways can lead to the **generation** of **knowledge**, the **exchange** of **information**, and **innovation** in approaches to **problemsolving**. In essence, this research focused on what is working well and looked for ways to apply those methods to homeland security organizations.

An examination of crowdsourcing models across a range of disciplines indicated that given the right conditions, citizens are willing and able to **effect positive change** and **solve problems**. Moreover, citizens are **highly effective** at **contributing to projects** in which they are engaged, such as environmental monitoring, the arts, hackathons, and space exploration. A number of potential **homeland security applications** emerged as well. These included developing core values for **public participation** to ensure equity and integrity, rapid **production of new ideas** for a time-sensitive problems, and broad **information collection** and **reporting** in a crisis. In nearly every case, non-professionals needed only the right conditions to be present for them to engage.

What this thesis discovered in the process was **connective tissue**—ideas for connecting the concepts found across the models examined—to endeavors in homeland security. A key idea discussed in an NPS lecture that also emerged as an observable theme across the research was the notion of viewing government in general as a platform for innovation rather than a mechanism for the provision of services.1 By understanding a citizen’s **motivations to engage**, government can begin to design more **optimal opportunities** for that engagement. By also considering business and customer-service sector models, government can discover new ways to **increase knowledge** and **value creation**.

In considering implementation of **crowdsourcing** and **engagement models**, organizations should consider ethical, legal, and social issues as they develop programs involving **citizen contributors**. This thesis advanced several specific recommendations intended to begin forming a framework for crowdsourcing in homeland security. First, convene a multidisciplinary commission under the auspices of FEMA and DHS to further explore and advance the issue. Second, have FEMA and/or DHS select several agencies to host pilot programs for crowdsourcing projects. Third and finally, dedicate **inquiry and research** to incorporating **social science curriculum** into **homeland security education** (or viewing homeland security as a social science) to better understand the human aspects of homeland security endeavors.

This research may help contribute to the discourse and literature by providing a **theoretical policy framework** that embraces **non-traditional approaches** to meeting **homeland security objectives**. It may help **open new pathways** to **civic engagement** or create the conditions in which that engagement can thrive.

**Specifically true for geopolitical threats** – inductive reasoning, cognitive flexibility, AND probabilistic analysis of geopolitical events **– increases the accuracy of predictions – which solves their offense by checking the excesses of the security complex**

**Bisogno 17** (Raymond Bisogno, June 2017, “Problem Solving in Homeland Security and Creating Policy Conditions For Enhanced Civic Engagement: An Examination of Crowdsourcing Models,” The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/14064>) nihara

B. CROWDSOURCING FOR FORECASTING **GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS**

The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) is the counterpart to the Pentagon’s DARPA. According to IARPA’s website, it invests in “high-risk, highpayoff research programs to tackle some of the most difficult challenges of the agencies and disciplines in the Intelligence Community.”47 IARPA sponsored a competition called the Good Judgement Project (GJP) to explore intelligence matters and the ability of people who are not professional intelligence analysts to forecast global political events. IARPA initially recruited graduate students, faculty, and practitioners from the political science realm.48 While a study from the University of Pennsylvania by Lyle Ungar et al. noted that **strong forecasters** exhibited higher levels of **political knowledge** and **general intelligence**, average citizens with modest training in probability and statistics and no access to classified material were able to **predict geopolitical events** with a success margin as much as **thirty percent higher** than career intelligence analysts who did have access to classified material.49 This uneven performance was not due to extraordinary abilities on the part of citizen-participants, nor was it a reflection of the career analysts’ skills; it was an outcome of the laws of probability and statistics. In an April 2014 report on the GJP, National Public Radio (NPR) explains that balancing a **wide range of predictions** can lead to a more **reliable finding** “at the center.”50 Philip Tetlock et al., writing about the GJP for the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, assessed forecasts over a two-year period. After more than 150,000 forecasts, 743 participants, 199 events, and two years, they described favorable performance predictors as follows:

The best forecasters … were better at **inductive reasoning**, **pattern detection**, **cognitive flexibility**, and **open-mindedness**. They had greater understanding of **geopolitics**, training in **probabilistic reasoning**, and opportunities to succeed in cognitively enriched team environments. Last but not least, they viewed forecasting as a skill that required **deliberate practice**, **sustained effort**, and **constant monitoring** of current affairs.51

In further examining participants’ profiles, Tetlock et al. explain that the best forecasters “benefitted from working environments with **probability training** and collaborative teams. And while making predictions, they spent more time deliberating and **updating their forecasts**.”52 Moreover, the predictors of effective forecasting persisted **across multiple data sets**.53 Some of the participants, based on their forecasting performance, came to be known as super-forecasters.54 One such “super” was a gentleman named Nick Hare. He noted that his success as a forecaster did not have as much to do with his own body of knowledge as it did with his **open-minded approach** as well as his ability to apply the **scientific method** in evaluating the data rather than accept a **predefined narrative**.55

As noted by Ungar et al., working in groups greatly improves prediction accuracy.56 The question of how to utilize the wisdom of the crowds, this study recognizes, is more difficult to answer than whether or not that wisdom is valuable: “Although the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ and the power of predictive markets are widely recognized, it is less clear how to best make use of that wisdom.”57 An important dynamic the study observes is the risk of group-think when experts are able to discuss their predictions. While the study acknowledges the inverse is also possible—that better arguments can be formed this way—this thesis theorizes there may be a risk of **groupthink** in homeland security and **government enterprises** unless outside perspectives are considered due to **cultural biases** and **organizational tendencies**. Replicating the GJP in the HSE may represent a viable pathway for the **contribution of ideas** to help solve the **nation’s complicated problems**.

**2AC – Security K – Scenarioplanning**

**Evaluating conflict dynamics through scenario analysis** that applies political-strategic analytical requirements **aids development of more rigorous, transparent, and realistic scenarios to avoid militarized crises escalation of hybrid warfare – BUT, does NOT limit effective response**

**Heath & Lane 19** (Timothy R. Heath, Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining RAND in October 2014, he served as the senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group. He has over twenty years of experience researching and analyzing military and political topics related to China. In addition to his publications with the RAND Corporation, Heath has published numerous articles and one book. Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, he has extensive experience analyzing China's national strategy, politics, ideology, and military, as well as Asian regional security developments. He has a Ph.D. in political science from George Mason Unversity and an M.A. in Asian studies from George Washington University. Matthew Lane, 2019, “Science-Based Scenario Design A Proposed Method to Support Political-Strategic Analysis,” RAND Corporation, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2833.html>) nihara

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

How do **major conflicts start** and how can we **tell** when a **crisis** might **escalate** to a military **confrontation**? These questions have long confronted U.S. policymakers, but they take on new **urgency** as **great power competition** intensifies with **China** and **Russia** and **flash points** fester across the **Middle East** and elsewhere.1 Understanding the dynamics of **crisis escalation** and **conflict occurrence** are necessary to help **intelligence analysts** and **policymakers** understand whether particular crises are **more** or **less likely** to **escalate** and how **U.S. actions**, such as the deployment of additional forces to a crisis, might **ameliorate** or **exacerbate** those dynamics. In addition, understanding the **underlying causes** of crisis **escalation** and military conflict, and how those dynamics are affected by emergent **geopolitical trends**, can help defense planners to more **effectively anticipate** and **prepare** for potential **contingencies**.

The **challenge** of **anticipating** a military **contingency** is further compounded by the **increasing** reliance on **ambiguous** forms of interstate conflict favored by states like **China** and **Russia** that **blur the line** between military and nonmilitary actions. These tactics, labeled “**gray zone**” or “**hybrid warfare**,” often feature state-backed forces who engage in coercive or violent actions but below a threshold that **typically triggers** U.S. military **combat operations** on behalf of an ally.2 These tactics allow adversaries to incrementally **advance state aims** while **minimizing** the **risks** of conflict. They also offer the advantage of **rapid fielding** relevant **capabilities** with **minimal warning** to **U.S. forces**, requiring the United States to **act quickly** in **ambiguous** circumstances. Moreover, these tactics, while effective, invariably carry a risk of sparking **militarized crisis** and subsequently, the potential for **escalation** to conventional military conflict.

In some cases, hybrid warfare operations could be deliberately planned as when “snap exercises” by Russia disguise movements of military forces.3 If the United States is **ill prepared** to respond in such cases, there is a possibility that U.S. and Allied forces could be surprised and suffer losses.4 Similarly, the development of artificial islands in the South China Sea effectively masked, until recently, China’s military intentions to gain greater control of the maritime region through a fait accompli.5 These actions **threaten U.S. allies** and raise the risk that a **crisis** could **escalate** into a **military engagement** that could **draw in** U.S. **forces**. The challenge of responding to these threats is compounded by **constrained** defense **resources** that have led to **reductions** in **deployed forces** abroad. These realities have **increased** the **imperative** to accurately **anticipate** and **effectively respond** to the **threat of conflict** in a timely manner.

In this report, we aim to achieve four things. First, we distinguish between politicalstrategic and military decisions in the work of defense planning. We argue that many of the questions regarding the onset of **conflict**, **management** of **crises**, and escalation or **de-escalation** of conflict are primarily **political-strategic** in nature and thus have **analytic requirements** distinctly different from those for military decisions. Second, we explain why the current practice of employing scenarios to support political-strategic decisions is problematic. Current doctrine articulates a **rigorous methodology** to support **military decisions**, but **guidance** on how to develop **assumptions** and address nonmilitary factors remains largely **undeveloped** or **absent**. Accordingly, existing methods favor the development of scenarios that feature problems of **opaque method**ology, **unfounded assumptions**, and **implausibility** when applied to politicalstrategic concerns. These defects not only **impair efforts** to develop more **rigorous analysis** to support political-strategic decisions, but they can also **impede analysis** to support **military decisions**. Third, we argue that recent findings in **social science** regarding **variables** related to **crises** and **conflicts** offer the potential to remedy these defects and aid the development of more **rigorous**, **transparent**, and **realistic scenarios**. We survey some of these key, albeit tentative, findings regarding both the **structural**, or underlying, factors, and the **proximate**, or immediate, factors responsible for militarized crisis and conflict. Finally, we show how **scenario designers** can **incorporate** these factors into more **holistic**, **rigorous**, and **politically realistic** assumptions, a process that we call “**science-based structured scenarios**.” We also show how these sciencebased structured scenarios can be **tailored** to **flexibly suit** the **specific needs** of defense planners. To illustrate how this methodology might be applied, we provide an example centered on a hypothetical China-Taiwan conflict.

**2AC – Securitization Theory = Racist**

**Securitization theory is irredeemably racist**

**Alison and Richter-Monpetit 20** (Howell, Alison, and Melanie Richter-Montpetit. “Is Securitization Theory Racist? Civilizationism, Methodological Whiteness, and Antiblack Thought in the Copenhagen School.” Security Dialogue, vol. 51, no. 1, Feb. 2020, pp. 3–22, doi:10.1177/0967010619862921) nihara

Abstract This article provides the first excavation of the foundational role of racist thought in securitization theory. We demonstrate that Copenhagen School **securitization theory** is structured not only by **Eurocentrism** but also by **civilizationism**, **methodological whiteness**, and **antiblack racism**. Classic securitization theory advances a conceptualization of ‘normal politics’ as reasoned, civilized dialogue, and securitization as a **potential regression** into a **racially coded** uncivilized ‘**state of nature’**. It justifies this through a **civilizationist history** of the world that **privileges Europe** as the **apex** of **civilized ‘desecuritization’**, sanitizing its violent **(settler-) colonial projects** and the **racial violence** of normal liberal politics. It then constructs a methodologically and normatively **white framework** that uses speech act theory to locate ‘progress’ towards normal politics and desecuritization in Europe, making becoming like Europe a moral imperative. Using ostensibly neutral terms, securitization theory prioritizes order over justice, positioning the securitization theorist as the defender of (**white) ‘civilized politics’** against **(racialized) ‘primal anarchy’**. **Antiblackness** is a **crucial** building-block in this conceptual edifice: securitization theory finds ‘**primal anarchy**’ especially in ‘Africa’, casting it as an **irrationally oversecuritized** foil to ‘**civilized politics’**. We conclude by discussing whether the theory, or even just the concept of securitization, can be recuperated from these racist foundations. Introduction Securitization theory has unquestionably made a significant impact. Its founding texts are among the most widely cited international relations scholarship (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995; Wæver et al., 1993), spawning active research programs and new ‘generations’ of securitization theory. The concept of securitization has travelled to disciplines beyond international relations, and even entered public discourse. What is so appealing about this theory? Perhaps the most tempting aspect of securitization theory is its methodological rigor. It provides a clear set of steps and standards for identifying how referent objects (e.g. migration, health, cyberspace) become security problems and deciding whether they should indeed be ‘securitized’. This readymade methodology can be applied to all sorts of empirical areas. However, students and scholars of security ought to resist this temptation of a readymade approach and inquire more deeply into securitization theory’s core theoretical assumptions and methodology. This article argues that **racist thought** is **fundamental** and **integral** to classic securitization theory’s conceptual and methodological project. While other scholarship has worked either to incorporate analysis of race into securitization theory (Amin-Khan, 2012; Ibrahim, 2005; Mofette and Vadasaria, 2016) or to overcome securitization theory’s Eurocentrism (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), this article offers something different. It is the first to excavate the foundations of securitization theory in racist thought. We demonstrate that classic securitization theory is fundamentally and inextricably structured not only by **Eurocentrism** but also by **civilizationism**, **methodological whiteness**, and **antiblack racism**. What does it mean to excavate the racist foundations of a theory? That we use the ‘r-word’ and white supremacy as categories of analysis is sure to raise eyebrows. Even sympathetic readers might wonder if the problem we identify is more appropriately characterized as Eurocentrism. Critique of the Eurocentric character of much Western scholarship and cultural production has made significant inroads across academic disciplines, including international relations (Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013). Our analysis is inspired by this research and extends some of its insights. Yet there is more to be said. **Black studies** and **decolonial scholarship** demonstrate that much orthodox and critical Western social and political thought is predicated upon **epistemological** and **ontological** premises that are not simply Eurocentric but **racist**, specifically **white supremacist**. In international relations, recent debates have addressed the question of whether postcolonial international relations should proceed solely through an analytic of Eurocentrism or whether we need to more specifically address racism and white supremacism (Gruffydd Jones, 2016; Hozić, 2016; Rutazibwa, 2016; Sajed, 2016). Sajed (2016: 168) suggests that the term ‘Eurocentric’ potentially neutralizes the foundational and continuing racism of the discipline. Rutazibwa (2016: 192) asks, ‘what existing power structure does this reluctance [to name racism] serve?’ Echoing these concerns, we ask: What is at stake in the reluctance to name racism in analyses of international security? Racism is a fundamental system of power that has profoundly shaped the world for the past several hundred years. Moreover, as is now well established, international relations emerged to provide intellectual support for the imperial and (settler-)colonial ambitions of Western states (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004a; Krishna, 2001; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Drawing on black studies, indigenous studies, and decolonial scholarship, we illustrate the racist modes of thought that underpin classic securitization theory by deploying three concepts beyond Eurocentrism: civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. The argument presented here is not a **personal indictment** of any **particular author**. Contrary to commonsense notions that reduce racism to interpersonal prejudices of openly bigoted individuals, racism and white supremacy are systems of power (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Epistemic racism is **intrinsic** to **Western knowledge structures**, and not merely a failure of individual scholarship (Bhambra, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2003). Just as the ongoing racialized distribution of life chances across liberal societies is not simply the effect of intentionally racist individuals, racialized knowledge production is not simply the result of bad or flawed **individual theorists**. Colonial and racist assumptions about racial and civilizational difference animate the core political categories and theoretical frameworks of Western social and political thought. As we demonstrate, this is also true of classic **securitization theory**. We begin by acknowledging that discussions of racism or colonialism are not entirely absent in classic securitization theory. Security: A New Framework for Analysis briefly discusses the racial politics of US domestic societal security (Buzan et al., 1998: 130). In one of securitization theory’s original formulations, Wæver discusses neo-Nazi attacks on asylum-seekers and racist justifications for the securitization of migration (Wæver, 1995; 70; see also Buzan et al., 1998; 42, 44–45). Colonialism is sometimes referenced (see Buzan et al., 1998: 61, 63, 98, 129; Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 14–18, 221), and white supremacism is mentioned as a potential ‘macrosecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 2009: 263). Our argument is not that race is absent in securitization theory, but that **racist political thought** is **integral** to it, even when classic securitization theory texts **discuss race** or **colonialism**. The article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the securitization theory framework and notable criticisms of it. The second focuses on the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory, showing how its conceptualization of ‘politics’ and ‘security’ is founded in civilizationist thought. The third section focuses on securitization theory’s methodology, highlighting its methodological whiteness. The fourth section illustrates how antiblackness is a crucial building-block in securitization theory’s conceptual division between security and politics. Securitization theory finds ‘primal anarchy’ especially in ‘Africa’, which it casts as irrationally oversecuritized, making it a foil to ‘civilized politics’. Throughout, we focus on classic articulations of securitization theory associated with the Copenhagen School. Classic securitization theory is very much an ongoing intellectual project that continues to be assertively defended by its founders (Buzan and Wæver, 1997; Wæver, 2011, 2015), and its basic precepts are in need of questioning in new ways. However, we are not unaware of divergences in ‘second-generation’ and other iterations of securitization theory. We therefore conclude with some thoughts about whether other versions of securitization theory emulate or dispense with the racism of classic securitization theory, and a discussion of whether the theory, or even just the word ‘securitization’, can be salvaged.

**2AC – Russia revisionist**

**Russian revisionism is the greatest threat to the international order by constant escalation and expansionism through aggressive military force – empirics**

**Pisciotta 20** (Pisciotta, Barbara, Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Roma Tre University, 2020, "Russian Revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria." Italian Political Science Review 50.1, pp. 87-106, doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.18) nihara

Most scholars of international relations today believe that the **international order** is in **crisis**. Haas (Haas, 2015) suggests a gradual transformation of the international system into a post-hegemonic global governance, Acharya (Acharya, 2014) the formation of a less centralized system based on regional level interactions, and Kahler (Kahler, 2013) the emergence of new rising powers as moderate reformers influencing the change of international rules through the existing forums.

In the sphere of challenges to the **liberal world order**, Allison (Allison, 2014) sees Vladimir **Putin's annexation** of the **Crimea** as the most visible threat to the **stability** and **preservation** of the present international order. In his view, Russia's **blatant violation** of **international norms**, backed up by **military force** in the **absence** of any **conditions** legitimizing its use, is **indicative** of an **aggressive strategy** designed to **oppose western rules** politically, culturally, and militarily (Allison, 2017). As effectively pointed out by Krastev (Krastev, 2014: 3), Putin's vision of the new world is one of **constant escalation** aimed at **altering** the **status quo**: ‘He has refused to play by Western rules. He seems not to fear political isolation; he invites it. He seems not worry about the closing of borders; he hopes for it. His foreign policy amounts to deep **rejection** of modern **Western values** and an attempt to draw a **clear line** between **Russia's world** and Europe's. For Putin, Crimea is likely just the beginning’.

What is the nature of the threats that Russia poses to the present international order? Can Russia be described as an authentic revisionist power? Is the military intervention in Crimea really just the beginning? How are we to interpret Moscow's decision to intervene in Syria?

If we assume that the **rise of Putin**, strengthened by his fourth presidential mandate, constitutes a factor **essential** to any understanding of Russian **foreign politics** over the last decade and its inclusion, at least at first sight, among these so-called ones rising powers, it follows that an in-depth analysis of the nature of the challenges that Moscow is making to the world liberal order will entail first of all a reconstruction of the political and strategic context in which these challenges have begun to take shape. Russia's current **refusal to accept** the rules of the **post-bipolar** system passively and therefore to comply with a **redistribution** of power that **denies** the country its previously acquired **centrality** is the result of a series of closely connected events that have developed since the end of the Cold War (Pisciotta, Reference Pisciotta, Clementi, Dian and Pisciotta2018).

On the basis of the above premises, this paper seeks to develop a new typology of **revisionism** based on the nature of the aims (territorial/normative/hierarchy of prestige), the means employed (peaceful/violent), and the level of action (regional/global). This will then be used to **explain** the **escalation** of Russia's foreign policy from **regional** to **global claims** with reference to its **military interventions** in **Georgia**, **Ukraine**, and **Syria** and to identify the type of **revisionism involved in each** of the three Russian military interventions undertaken both **inside** (Georgia and Ukraine) and **outside** (Syria) the **post-soviet space**.

To this end, the paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the concept of revisionism and suggests a classification of six kinds in relation to the means, nature, and level of the claims put forward by revisionist powers. The second discusses the **interventions** carried out by Russia within its regional area (in Georgia and Ukraine) and highlights their **similarities** in light of the predominant model of **revisionism**. The third analyses the military intervention in Syria and notes both the **escalation** in the projection of **Russian claims** from the **regional** level to the **global** and the type of **revisionism** involved.

**Our methodological approach to determine Russian revisionism is an effective heuristic, delimiting it’s application which solves the links – BUT, confining it to a set of realistic threats – AND, analyzing individual actions to accurately depict and compare foreign policy**

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A new typology of revisionism

In addition to the nature of the revisionist objectives (territory, international norms, or prestige) and the means employed (violent or peaceful), there is another crucial aspect that the literature has not taken into account: the **level of action**, which can be **regional** or **global**. As we'll see, this aspect is crucial for the development of a new **typology of revisionism**.

At the **regional level**, the intent to control or **annex a territory**, reformulate the norms, modify the regional structure, or alter the hierarchy of prestige is confined exclusively to the regional area in which the revisionist power is located. More specifically, the regional area delimits the actions that a state can decide to undertake with respect to the countries dependent on it and/or geographically, economically, and culturally involved in relations with it. The **degree of danger** of the threat of possible changes to the status quo is a **reflection** of **regional balances of power** and directly affects the **neighbouring states** and those located in the area. The Chinese policy of investments in South-East Asia and Russia's economic, energy, and military policy towards the former Soviet republics provide two excellent examples of action confined to the regional level.

When the demands of the revisionist power extend beyond its regional area, the challenge can instead involve the **dominant global power** (or powers) directly with the risk of **limiting** or **compromising** its (their) **strategic interests** and **spheres of influence** at the **global level**. In this case, unlike the previous one, the action undertaken by the revisionist state, be it peaceful or violent, tends to go beyond the boundaries of its regional area and extend to the **international order**, thus affecting the **international norms**, the **hierarchy of prestige**, the **distribution of power** and the **control** or conquest of territories, neighbouring, and otherwise. It is known that the regional and the global levels are both ‘external’ with respect to national boundaries (Pisciotta, 2016). In order to avoid misunderstandings, here we prefer to use the term ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to stress the difference between a geographically delimited space (regional) and a potentially open space (global), by definition exposed to any external factor (regional, international, transnational).

The three dimensions of revisionism, namely the level of the aims (regional or global), their nature (territory/norms/power/prestige), and the means employed (violent or peaceful), can thus be used to develop six different kinds of revisionism as shown in Table 1.

**[TABLE 1 OMITTED]**

This typology contains two new elements with respect to those formulated in the past. The first regards the introduction of the level of action (regional/global) undertaken by the revisionist state. As we shall see below, this dimension is of crucial importance to highlight the **gradual escalation** of aims and the means employed, especially when there is recourse to **military force**, in transition from the regional to the global level. The **degree of danger** of the threat to the status quo is **directly proportional** to the **level** at which action is undertaken. In the present international system, where various actors would find it in their interest to counterbalance US hegemony but lack the means to do so, it is of crucial importance to note the presence of an actor that has **no hesitation** in resorting to **military force** in the pursuit of its own interest outside its **regional area** and without the consent of the **hegemonic power**.

The second regards the relation between **means** employed, **level of action**, and **objectives**. If all three dimensions work simultaneously to determine the type of revisionism, it is possible to compare the different **empirical cases** and **highlight similarities** and **differences** between the different forms of foreign policy, which would collapse if there were no connections between their objectives, means, and level of action. For example, two countries can both pursue the aim of changing the hierarchy of international prestige, and therefore act at the global level, but may choose to use force or diplomacy. It is true that the degree of threat to the status quo can be equally high, especially when the action undertaken proves more underhand and less visible, but the use of military force, being more **explicit** and **devastating**, can require equally explicit and devastating means in order to restore the status quo. Moreover, the use of military force **outside** a country's **regional area** can be associated both with objectives of **territorial conquest**, the **pursuit of hegemony** and a complete **change in the status quo**, and with objectives of mere **control** over zones of **strategic importance** together with the security of **national borders** and increase in **power** and prestige. There is evidently a substantial difference between these two kinds of revisionism and hence a drastic difference in the level of the threat to the status quo. Equally different are two forms of foreign policy that both opt for the use of peaceful means but pursue markedly different objectives at the global level, such as changing international norms or regimes on the one hand or the hierarchy of power on the other. While both can produce substantial change at the global level, it is clearly only the second type of revisionism that can potentially affect the distribution of power.

In this framework, **nationalist** revisionism, **radical** revisionism, and **revolutionary** revisionism represent three forms of change in terms both of **expansion** and of **control over territory** on the part of the revisionist power. All three presuppose the use of **military force** and objectives of **power** and **territory** with a **gradual escalation** in the degree of change pursued. The first (**nationalist**) involves forms of territorial expansionism or annexation with respect to neighbouring countries for the improvement of power and prestige at the regional level. The second (radical) is an intermediate modality of change in prestige and/or power at the global level, with or without any intention to alter the international norms, through the acquisition of the part of the revisionist state of territorial control over areas that are geographically distant but regarded as strategically vital to its national interests. The third and most extreme (**revolutionary**) is based on military conquest and the overall redistribution of power, rules and territory at the global level. The (**nationalist**) **Russian** military **interventions** in **Georgia** and **Ukraine**, the (**radical**) Russian military intervention in **Syria**, and the (revolutionary) foreign policy of Nazi Germany are three examples of each of the type put forward. It should be pointed out that in the typology presented here, only revolutionary revisionism – which should hopefully constitute no more than a text-book hypothesis in the current situation – corresponds to the kind identified by Buzan, while our radical revisionism is very different in meaning from his. Anyway, here we prefer to use the same term because it is the most appropriate to express our type of revisionism.

Moderate revisionism, normative revisionism, and reformist revisionism indicate three kinds of foreign policy pursued with non-military means of diplomatic and/or economic nature and again involve a gradual escalation of objectives and radius of action. A state may decide to strengthen its position at the regional level through a whole gamut of policies ranging from diplomatic or commercial relations with bordering and/or culturally similar states to the imposition of agreements highly advantageous to its national interests (moderate revisionism). It may decide to undertake large-scale diplomatic action at the global level to modify certain norms and rules of the international system in order to reduce the economic, social, and political costs they involve for the country (normative revisionism). It may use diplomatic and financial means to improve its power and/or prestige at the global level and even pursue a change in international norms (reformist revisionism). The policy of investments adopted by China in the less developed countries of South-East Asia (moderate), the aspirations of the Group of 77 for the NIEO (normative), and the Chinese policy of peaceful/rise/development at the global level (reformist) are examples of the three kinds of revisionism listed above.

Since every kind of revisionism always seeks a change in the status quo, differing in intensity but in any case always substantial, it follows that even when economic means are employed to attain the set objectives, the effects produced are anything but mild. On the basis of this assumption, the typology put forward here can provide an **effective heuristic tool** for two reasons. First of all, the close relationship between means and objectives makes it possible to **delimit** the **sphere of application** of the concept of revisionism and **confine** it in most cases solely to states possessing **sufficient military** and economic resources to be able to **aspire realistically** to a change in the regional status quo and hope to strengthen their position with respect to the hegemonic power at the global level. The weaker states will therefore hardly be able to pursue any form of revisionism other than the normative with any reasonable probability of success.

Secondly, the **distinction** between the **regional** and **global levels** makes it possible not only to reconstruct an **escalation of objectives** as regards change in the status quo but it is also possible to **identify** a **predominant** level of revisionism that characterizes an **entire phase** of foreign policy and is the result of a series of more or less **interconnected** individual actions when the fundamental objective of the state tends to remain comparatively stable over time. If this does not happen, it may prove more useful to determine the **different facets** that emerge from the **discontinuity** of a **specific phase** of foreign policy through analysis of the **individual decisions** taken.

Undue importance should not be attached to any discrepancy between reformist and radical actions, as the use of **military force**, once adopted at the global level, drives the **desire for change** in a direction from which it is not always possible to turn back and that tends to **characterize** a foreign policy far **more strongly** than simple **reformism**. In this case, the connection between means and objectives emerges from the notion of ‘uncertainty’ introduced by Schweller with reference to the decision of a revisionist state to resort to force. According to the author, this **uncertainty** arises from the effective **military capacity** of the revisionist state with respect to that of its potential allies and the adversary, the **importance** of what is at stake for both sides in the conflict, and the possible **involvement** of **other actors**. Schweller argues that this is a **crucial criterion** for the identification of actors as **risk-acceptant** and **risk-averse**: ‘Risk-acceptant actors are gamblers, while risk-averse actors are cautious under conditions of uncertainty. Risk-acceptant leaders, because they attach some **added utility** to the act of taking a gamble, are **less constrained** in **making war** decisions than are risk-averse actors; they are the actors most likely to **saber-rattle**, to **ruthlessly engage** in greedy **expansion**, and to anticipate bandwagon effects’ (Schweller, 2015: 10). If risk acceptance thus constitutes a key **determining factor** within the sphere of revisionism, it follows – as Schweller argues – that risk-acceptant and revolutionary powers are the most **virulent expanders**.

Although theoretically the military option however represents a risk, in the analysis of Russian foreign policy the reference to this concept simplifies the understanding of the nature of the revisionist aims, especially in terms of nationalist claims, as we will see in the Ukrainian case. The following **empirical analysis** seeks to **explain** the nature of the **Russian military interventions** in **Georgia**, **Ukraine**, and **Syria** with reference to two central aspects: (1) the **gradual escalation** of Russia's **objectives** from the **regional** level to the **global** and (2) the **classification** of the three military interventions in terms of the **typology of revisionism** put forward here.

**Russia is decisively revisionist – our typology of revisionism and predictive, empirical analysis are BOTH valuable and accurate**

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On the assumptions that changing the status quo is the basic aim of a revisionist strategy (Buzan, 2008) and that acceptance of the risks involved in the use of force is a key factor in distinguishing the different forms of revisionism (Schweller, 2015), this study puts forward a **new typology** of revisionism. The six types identified are based on three dimensions: the **means** employed (peaceful/violent), the nature of the **objectives** (territory/norms/power), and the **level of action** (regional/global). The introduction of a new typology of revisionism can also **stimulate** further **research** on the possible change of goals, means, and level of action of the potential claims of the revisionist powers that have economic and military capabilities to act both regionally and globally to change the status quo (see the case of Russia, China and, according to some scholars, the United States). Further **research insights** can be derived from the **application** of **normative revisionism** to the various **empirical cases** (see the Arab countries and the developing).

Our **empirical analysis**, in particular, confirms the **importance** of the **level of action** as a new element with respect to previous typologies and makes it possible not only to demonstrate the **central part** played by the **military option** in **Russian strategy** inside and outside the post-Soviet space but also and above all to **confirm** the **escalation** of the **revisionist objectives** pursued both at the **regional level** with the interventions in **Georgia** and **Ukraine**, and at the **global level** with the intervention in **Syria**. The respectively **nationalist** (Georgia and Ukraine) and **radical** (Syria) nature of the interventions emerges in relation both to the means and the level of action of these interventions, and to the objectives. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia obtained the **control** and/or **annexation** of **territories** like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, strengthened its position with respect to **neighbouring countries**, and **impeded** the **expansion** of **NATO** and the EU. In Syria it obtained control of the port of Tartus, ended the American monopoly in the war on terrorism by asserting itself as a strong party to the peace negotiations, challenged American interests in the Middle East by strengthening the Assad regime, and clearly manifested its determination to halt the decline that set in after 1989. The **dual nature** of Russia's objectives – both **territorial** (**annexation** and/or **control** over certain areas) and **political** (improvement of **power** and **prestige** at the **regional** and **global levels**) – characterized the country's **revisionist strategy** as a whole from August 2008 to March 2016, confirming the **importance** of the gradual **increase** in **military expenditure** and the reforms of the SAP in pursuit of the same.

If the spectre of the ‘end of history' that hovered over the ashes of communism was swept away by Putin at the end of the 1990s and the impact that his long period in power has had on domestic and regional balances is unquestionable, what is instead **still in need** of **discussion** is the effect that his plan of radical revisionism has had on the **configuration** of the **international system** as a whole. As matters now stand, any talk of **American decline** at the military level is **misleading** and **empirically incorrect**. It is, however, necessary to take the **readiness** to use military force as our **starting point** if we are to understand the nature and the **consequences** of **Russian revisionism** at the global level. A power in a position of hegemony **cannot** in fact **hesitate** to use all of the diplomatic, economic, and **military** means at its disposal in order to **preserve its status** and **prevent** any **destabilizing threats** from calling it into question. The USA has made systematic use of force since 1989 to preserve its spheres of influence all over the world and eliminate threats (from figures like Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Qaddafi) to the stability of the liberal world order on which its indisputable supremacy rested. Where it intervened militarily, with or without a resolution of the UN Security Council, it told the rest of the world that it was the only actor authorized – or rather self-authorized – to intervene in defence, at least formally, of human rights at the expense of national sovereignty.

Russia's revisionism is the child of this strategy. In order to alter the status quo in its favour, Putin has operated on at both the regional and the global levels to **oppose American expansion** in the post-Soviet space and its version of humanitarian intervention all over the world, not hesitating to **use force** in order to challenge the United States openly and **bend** the **international rules** to Russia's advantage. At the regional level, **Georgia** and **Ukraine** have been **blocked**. Their entry into the EU and NATO will not be possible without Russian consent or the risk of a frontal clash with Moscow.

At the global level, the effects of Russia's strategy will have to be assessed in the medium and long terms. Russia has now revealed its intentions and explicitly threatened the US monopoly in Syria both in words and in deeds. It is clearly **not enough** for Russia to **alter** the **hierarchy of power**. It wants to obtain acknowledgement of its prestige as a **great power** in both diplomatic and **military terms**. In other words, Russia wants to play a decision-making part once again in the management of world affairs. It also wants a **less centralized system** offering the opportunity to **regain** important margins of **power**.

**Appeasement triggers Russian adventurism which turns their impacts, withdraws support from Baltic defense, AND upends the international order – causing prolif and disrupting trade**

**Goncharenko 20** (Oleksiy Goncharenko, Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian lawmaker with the European Solidarity party, 2-27-2020, "The lesson of Crimea: Appeasement never works," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-lesson-of-crimea-appeasement-never-works/>) nihara

Six years ago this week, a war began in Eastern Europe that has challenged our basic understanding of international aggression. Vladimir Putin’s **attack on Ukraine** has often been called a **hybrid war** due to Moscow’s reliance on a confusing cocktail of **unmarked troops**, **local proxies**, and blanket **disinformation**. The Kremlin has been careful to stop short of the conventional threshold for international aggression, but this has not diminished the global security implications of the conflict. Quite the opposite, in fact.

The Russian takeover of Crimea in February 2014 was not just a tragedy for Ukraine; it was a **watershed moment** for the entire post-WWII **international order**. Since annexing Crimea, Putin has launched an **invasion** of eastern **Ukraine** that has cost over 13,000 lives and displaced millions. He has dramatically **escalated** the carnage in **Syria**, deployed **non-state forces** everywhere from **Venezuela** and **Libya** to **Sudan** and the **C**entral **A**frican **R**epublic, and **sanctioned** a wave of political **assassinations** across Europe. Meanwhile, Russian disinformation campaigns, **cyber attacks**, and election meddling have become everyday facts of life.

Despite the **obvious** and **mounting costs** of **failing to confront** Putin in Crimea, some world leaders remain in **denial**. They talk of the need to **improve relations** with Russia and advocate **compromise** over **confrontation**, even if this means treating Putin’s **imperial ambitions** as **legitimate grievances**. This approach has produced **little of value**. After six years of escalating international insecurity, it is now time to abandon **attractive illusions** and acknowledge that **appeasement** only **encourages** further **Russian aggression**.

We have been here before. Europe’s previous attempts to appease a revisionist power with expansionist ambitions were similarly well-meaning, but they nevertheless resulted in WWII. Like Putin, Hitler also **rejected** the **international order** of the day and sought to create **new realities** on the ground through an audacious foreign policy linked to support for ethnic comrades left stranded abroad by post-war borders. When the Anschluss with Austria went ahead unopposed in March 1938, Hitler laid claim to the Sudetenland in neighboring Czechoslovakia. This led to the Munich Agreement, which has come to be recognized as the ultimate symbol of appeasement. Within a matter of months, Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist and a new world war was underway.

Comparisons with the 1930s are not entirely accurate. Unlike the abandoned Czechoslovakians, Ukraine refused to surrender in 2014 and has been opposing Russian aggression militarily for the past six years. Nor has there been any international attempt to legitimize the Russian annexation of Crimea as happened with the Sudetenland in Munich. On the contrary, the international community has imposed sanctions on Russia that have inflicted genuine economic damage, and has also introduced a number of symbolic measures to demonstrate its disapproval. However, there are growing indications that the resolve to maintain even these modest measures is now weakening.

Since taking office in early 2017, US President Donald Trump has been famously reluctant to criticize Putin. Recently, he has reiterated his [hope](https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-says-would-be-great-thing-for-russia-ukraine-to-reconcile/30450703.html) that Ukraine can “make a deal” with Moscow. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron continues to champion a comprehensive [reset](https://www.france24.com/en/20200215-macron-calls-for-better-long-term-relations-with-russia) with Russia while seemingly expecting little in return. Macron is not alone in this regard. He was only one of many leading European politicians to support Russia’s unconditional return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in summer 2019, despite Moscow’s refusal to address any of the issues that first led to Russia’s exclusion in 2014.

The trend continued at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020. Dubbed the “Davos for diplomats” and seen as the biggest event on the global security calendar, this year’s Conference was marked by the high-profile appearance of a Kremlin-friendly 12-point [plan](https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/group-statement/easlg-twelve-steps-toward-greater-security-in-ukraine-and-the-euro-atlantic-region/) towards peace in Ukraine that more closely resembled a roadmap for the country’s surrender. The twelfth and final point of this plan, which called for Russian involvement in the search for a new Ukrainian national identity, underlined the dangerous absurdity of the document. To many in Ukraine, it was also a further sign of the mounting appetite for a return to business as usual with Russia, even if this means sacrificing Ukrainian sovereignty and ignoring some of the most basic principles of international law.

There is much more at stake here than Ukraine’s continued existence as an independent nation. Efforts to appease Russia are **undermining** the **entire basis** of the modern **world order**. Instead of equal justice for all nations regardless of size, we risk returning to a world where **might is right** and **powerful nations** are able to **dominate** **smaller countries** at will. If left unchecked, the rise of **lawlessness** in **international affairs** will have all manner of **disastrous consequences** in areas ranging from **global trade** to **nuclear non-proliferation**.

To prevent this scenario from unfolding further, the international order must be defended in Ukraine, where the breach first occurred. This defense should include a significant tightening of sanctions against Russia until the Kremlin begins to demonstrate changes in its behavior. At the same time, the international community should strengthen its support for the Ukrainian military. This combination of **rising costs** and growing **deterrence** would send a **signal of strength** to Moscow while **stopping short** of provoking a **wider conflict**. As things stand, the **mixed messages** currently reaching Russia are all but **guaranteed** to **encourage** further **adventurism**.

There is no excuse for today’s politicians to repeat the mistakes of the past, regardless of their good intentions. History has already taught us that appeasement of an aggressor simply does not work. If the lesson of the 1930s was insufficient, we now have the additional example of the past six years to refresh memories. Vladimir Putin has demonstrated again and again that he believes power is more important than principles. It is up to the international community to prove him wrong. Failure to do so will have dire consequences for global security in the decade